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PANEL DISCUSSION I:
UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION: SATISFYING PADILLA'S
NEW DEFINITION OF COMPETENCE IN LEGAL
REPRESENTATION

Jennifer Chac6n
ChristopherLasch
Yolanda Vdzquez
MS. HARTILL: We have our panelists, Jennifer Chac6n,
Yolanda Vdzquez, Christopher Lasch. All of them have
researched in the area of immigration law and its connection
to criminal law.
Jennifer Chac6n received her J.D. from Yale Law
School and is now a professor at the University of
California, Irvine School of Law.
Yolanda Vdzquez is a professor at the University of
Cincinnati College of Law, and she helped on the Padilla v.
Kentucky case.
Christopher Lasch received his J.D. from Yale Law
School and now teaches at the University of Denver's Sturm
College of Law.
This morning we're pleased to announce Paula
Schaefer as the moderator. She's an esteemed professor here
at the University of Tennessee College of Law.
So without further ado, I'll introduce Jennifer
Chac6n.
JENNIFER CHACON: Good morning. It's a real privilege
to be here, and I wanted to take a moment to thank the
university for having us; the Dean, for his gracious
welcome; and also the many journals who are co-sponsoring
the event. I appreciate the support that they've given us, and
particularly a shout-out to Katie, who has been just a
tremendous guide to our experience and a never ending
stream of useful emails that got us where we were supposed
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to be and has just been great. So thanks to everybody for
making this so easy for me.
I am basically going to give a little bit of a general
overview about how we got to Padilla and what happens
now. And then my co-panelists are going to take it from
there and delve into some of the specific issues that Padilla
raises for practitioners. And then we're hoping to have a fair
amount of discussion and make sure that our comments are
responsive to your interest and your questions in the coming
hour. So I'll talk for about fifteen minutes just to provide a
little bit of overview about how we got where we are and
what we can expect I think in the near future, at least, with
regard to this merger of the criminal and the immigration
world. I really appreciated the world's colliding slide. That
was kind of emblematic I think of how particularly criminal
counsel saw the events leading up to it and its ramifications.
I've taught immigration law in the law school setting
now for nine years, and I also teach criminal law to firstyear students. And I routinely tell my first-year students
who are entering criminal law, "You're living in California,
if you're interested in criminal law, whether that be on the
defense side or the prosecution side, you really should take
an immigration class." I actually think it's really important.
It's become sufficiently important. You have a sufficient
number of non-citizens who are in the system, and the kind
of interwoven consequences are unavoidable. So it is
something that I tell my students. It's a little bit daunting, I
think in part, because, as we've been told, the immigration
code is ridiculously complex, unnecessarily complex, and
that in some ways raises challenges. And of course, it's
federal and doesn't completely map on what happens at the
level of state practice, creating additional complications.
And we'll talk about all of those things.
But I do think it's important to have an awareness of
what's happening in the immigration world, and hopefully,
we can kind of talk about some of those issues today.
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So I wanted to just start by talking a little bit about
the "how we got here." And in a way, the Padilla decision
navigates some of that for us. You see the discussion in the
majority's opinion about how the nature of the relationship
between immigration law and criminal law has changed
fairly gradually over the past few decades. In the past, kind
of certainly throughout the nineteenth century and into the
early twentieth century, there really weren't immigration
consequences to criminal violations. So you had this
immigration law on the books. You had at least some type
of prohibitions on entry. It started in 1875 really. But you
didn't have immigration consequences to criminal activity
that occurred within the United States really until 1917, and
even then, it was very, very limited. So only happening in a
few situations of crimes involving moral turpitude. There
were pretty strict limits on how long after somebody entered
those that the consequences could actually be applied. So
by and large, there really wasn't much overlap between the
way immigration law functioned and the criminal law. All
of this really started to change, and it changed radically, I
would say, beginning in the late '80s and proceeding through
the mid-'90s. At that time, you had a series of changes to
the law that really caused a merger between the immigration
law sphere and the criminal law sphere. Because in a series
of moves in revising immigration law, Congress attached all
manner of immigration consequences to a wide variety of
criminal convictions. And so they started out kind of in the
height of the war on drugs period by attaching immigration
consequences to drug crimes and extended that to a laundry
list of other offenses.
And probably most notably, and this was singled out
in the comments earlier this morning, developed a very
expansive definition of aggravated felony that had severe
consequences in the immigration world. So aggravated
felony sounds bad. It can be abstract, and many of them are.
But Congress has so expanded the list of crimes that
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constitute aggravated felonies that the old saying now goes
that they need be neither aggravated nor felonies to fit into
this category, so you have anything that - you have crimes
that in some cases could be state misdemeanors but that will
trigger the consequences of aggravated felonies. And the
consequences of aggravated felonies are severe. And I'll
talk a little bit more about kind of what that looks like in a
minute. But essentially the first point I want to emphasize is
that for a broad array of criminal convictions and a much
broader array of criminal convictions than you might think,
there are immigration consequences that follow. So that's
point one, which is almost any criminal conviction should
put you on alert that there may be criminal consequences.
And that's true whether you're talking about misdemeanors
or felonies, it's true whether you're talking about state
violations or federal.
The second major point that I think is important to
make is that, in those changes stemming from '88 to '96, and
particularly '96, the changes in the law really eliminated a
lot of discretion that immigration officials have to mediate
or moderate the impacts of the immigration consequences in
criminal convictions. So if you have an aggravated felony,
if you are charged with and convicted of something that
qualifies as an aggravated felony, there is really no room for
discretion no matter what the equities of the case might look
like otherwise. And this is different from what the law
looked like in the 1996 when there was a possibility for
cancellation of deportation in cases where there might be
sympathetic facts like the ones that Mr. Padilla presented
with. So a lot of the discretion is gone, which means that,
once that criminal conviction has attached, there's no going
back once somebody is in the immigration pipeline, and that
means that it's much more important to be aware and
cognizant on the front end of the immigration
consequences. Because no matter how sympathetic a person
might look, no matter how long they lived in the United
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States, those kinds of equities aren't going to be taken into
account in the deportation proceedings.
I think the other thing that's important to flag is that
a lot of people have tended to assume that these
consequences apply and flow primarily to individuals who
are present without authorization. And this, I think it gets it
exactly backwards. Individuals who are present without
authorization are removable because they are present
without authorization, the criminal consequences may in
some ways be less significant to them although it raises a
host of issues about their possibility of return. But where
criminal consequences often surprise people, your thinking
is like Padilla's, where you have a long-time lawful
permanent resident or people who are otherwise authorized
to be here who seem to live here in all meaningful sense of
the term but who become permanently deportable and
permanently barred by virtue of criminal convictions.
So these are the ways in which I think the criminal
law has really merged with immigration over the past
twenty years or so, making it really important for individuals
to be aware of the possible immigration consequences of
any criminal conviction or any that the client undertakes.
I think the second point that should be made about
this is, if we were talking about a small number of people
kind of going into the deportation system, maybe that
wouldn't be that significant, but one other thing that's
changed, particularly over the past decade, is the degree of
enforcement of immigration law in the country. So this has
been kind of a theme of common observations, and I think
it's worth stressing, since 2003 with the reorganization of the
immigration bureaucracy and with the placement of the
immigration agencies under the umbrella of the Department
of Homeland Security, there has been a massive increase in
resources dedicated toward immigration enforcement to the
tune of fifteen to twenty billion dollars a year spent on
immigration enforcement issues at this time. And so what
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that means is you have large law enforcement agencies,
including the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Agency, that are dedicated to not only enforcement at the
borders but interior enforcement. And what this means, of
course, is that large numbers of people who are here who
have been present for long periods of time who might in the
past not have come to the attention of the immigration
bureaucracy have a much greater likelihood of actually
coming to the attention of the immigration bureaucracy.
And added to this is a point that was made earlier, increased
information shared between the federal government and
state governments and better databases, which means that
individuals with criminal convictions are more likely to be
identified in various proceedings. So for all of these
reasons, you have more immigration enforcement, a more
accurate understanding of the records of immigration
coming into the system, and once they're in the system,
decreased discretion to deal with the potential consequences
of this on both sides. And that decreased discretion applies
not just to immigration officers but also to judges. In the
past, in the early days of immigration law, looking at the
early twentieth century, judges had the discretion when they
sentenced people in criminal court to make a determination
that those individuals should not be subject to deportation.
So the judge who sat in judgment on the crime could make a
call about whether this should also have immigration
consequences, and that, of course, is not the case anymore
either. So all around, once you're in the system, the degree
of discretion is really limited.
So those are kind of all reasons in which I think
we're seeing more of this linkage between criminal and
immigration. And the final reason that I'll flag that I think is
important that a later panel will be talking more about is
because there's a great deal more state and local involvement
in the enforcement of immigration laws, both under formal
programs like the 287(g) program, which I think is the
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specific topic of the upcoming panel, but also informallyled, individual law enforcement agencies, who decided for
whatever reason that immigration enforcement is a priority
with them and who accordingly select and profile potential
suspects when they think there's a likelihood that they might
also be immigration violators. So you have a lot more
enforcement on the ground, not just because there's a lot
more federal resources for the immigration enforcement but
also because states and localities in a variety of guises are
also taking a role in immigration enforcement. So
consequently, many more people have come into the
immigration pipeline by the initial point of entry of the
criminal justice or criminal law enforcement system.
So that's the crim-im merger that people talk about,
sometimes refer to it as crimmigration, and it's been a
phenomena of the past really fifteen years. A little bit more
than that but really kind of ramping up over the past fifteen
years.
Padilla is in some senses a response to this and also
a response to sort of the formalistic distinction that exists in
the law between deportation, which is viewed as civil, and
the criminal sphere. So Padillacomes against a background
of a long-standing line of case law that says that deportation
in itself is not a criminal consequence. This, obviously, has
huge implications for people in removal proceedings
because it means that the standard criminal procedural
protections that would apply in a criminal trial don't apply in
a removal proceeding. You're not entitled to counsel at the
government's expense, and things like detention, incident
removal is not viewed as incarceration with all of the
protections that that would entail. So you have this sphere
of removal and detention, incident to removal that exists in
the civil universe. And then you have the criminal world,
criminal convictions, which may and in many cases do
trigger immigration consequences in the civil sphere. And
so as the Padilla case makes clear and as the comments
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earlier made clear, the immigration consequences of the
criminal conviction are viewed as collateral or were viewed
as collateral as a collateral consequence of the initial
criminal conviction but not in and of themselves criminal
and, therefore, not necessarily covered by the same laws and
guidelines that provide for procedural protections in the
criminal sphere.
Padilla, in some senses, acknowledges the
fictitiousness of this boundary without totally dismantling
it. So it is, I think, a curious feature of the Padilla decision
that it doesn't say it is a requirement of defense counsel to
provide information on all collateral consequences. They
don't want to go down that road; they very clearly don't want
to go down that road. And so the road that they take is to
instead say that there's something peculiar about
immigration law. And the comments from both of the
earlier speakers highlight the kind of uncomfortableness of
that position. But it is true that, for some, immigration
consequences are probably more important than the criminal
conviction itself, but it might also be true for a sex offender,
who has to then go on the registry and can't live or work in
certain places, that those collateral consequences might also
be more consequential than the criminal conviction itself.
The right to vote might also be more consequential. If it
involves a professional license for somebody whose
profession is invocated by their criminal conviction, that
might also be more important. So there is something
uncomfortable in some ways about the distinction that the
Court carves between deportation and everything else. That
said, I think they were looking for a way to deal with the
severity of immigration consequences for criminal
convictions in the post-1996 world. You are dealing with a
situation where there is no opportunity for discretion. This
is in some ways an almost unique feature of immigration
law. And so if there is mis-advice, there's unfortunately no
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way to deal with that mis-advice once the ball gets rolling
on deportation.
And so you have this sort of a hybrid decision,
which basically says that it is true that there are limitations
on what counsel is required to do with regard to collateral
consequences. But these are not classic collateral
about
different
something
there's
consequences,
immigration, and it can consequentially misadvise in this
context. And even no advice in this context constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel. And we'll elaborate I think
a little on that in the upcoming discussions.
What then is required by Padilla, well, obviously, I
leave that a little bit to be fleshed out by my co-panelist, but
I do think there are a couple of points that I want to make.
And point number one is it obviously becomes the
prerogative of everyone who is dealing with a criminal
defendant to identify what their citizenship and immigration
statuses are. So if it's not one of the first questions, it
certainly should be one of the questions, where-were-youborn question that then leads to information about potential
citizenship status and potential immigration status. Just two
words on this that I want to stress; one is that citizenship
status is never ever as clear as we think it ought to be in
many of these cases. I've been astounded at the number of
people who find out that they are citizens in the course of
deportation proceedings, so never take citizenship as sort of
a given. It's not as transparent or easy as we might think,
particularly when we're talking about establishing a
citizenship, citizenship they have acquired by virtue of their
parents' citizenship status. So it's something to be taken not
at face value. And immigration history I think also is
something not to be taken at face value. People often don't
know their own status, and they certainly may not know
about the potential immigration options for them. A
criminal defense attorney may be the first lawyer that
they've really ever talked to about their immigration status
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and potential avenues of relief. So immigration status is
also not as clear or transparent as one might hope.
The immigration code is arcane, it looks a lot like
the tax code, it kind of requires that sort of approach. It's a
mess. And so I think it makes it rather daunting for some
people to think about advising on these consequences. That
said, and I heard this stressed, I think it's important to restress the point that is made in a publication called Cultural
Issues in Criminal Defense. Immigration is not rocket
science. It's hard, it's complex, it's strange, it's bizarre, and
it's counterintuitive, but it's not rocket science. And it is
something that we can figure out, and I hope that part of our
discussion can be about the best practices and how to figure
it out.

Where I want to close today is really talking about
what's next. Someone talked about the possibility that there
might be some sort of comprehensive immigration reform,
or I'll just take comprehensive right out of it because it won't
be comprehensive whatever it is. There may be some kind
of immigration reform that happens in the next year or so,
and so we might ask the question of what the implications of
that are or would be for Padilla obligations going forward.
And I think the answer is that, even if you get immigration
reform, it won't be comprehensive in any meaningful sense,
and it won't eliminate these kinds of burdens and obligations
and professional requirements that Padilla lays in place.
And I'll tell you a few reasons why I think that's true.
Reason number one is the immigration code will not
be simplified. I don't think Congress has the stomach, the
heart, and maybe the head for actually revising the
immigration code such that it will read in a sensible way
that would be easily understandable to your average noncitizen or even your average citizen attorney. So I think that
we can expect that the immigration code will continue to be
what it is, which is kind of an arcane statute that cross
references itself in confusing and sometimes contradictory
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ways. I don't think it will be cleaned up. So we'll still have
a very confusing body of immigration law after immigration
reform happens.
The other thing that we'll have after immigration
reform happens - well, two other things. One is, we'll
have a group of people who appear to be eligible on their
face for some kind of legalization, normalization, but they
actually have convictions or other criminal issues in the past
that are going to close that path for them. And the process
of the normalization or legalization will bring them to the
fore. So I think we'll see a group of people who may be
kind of flagged for possible removal as a consequence of
this, and that's just something that we should be aware will
happen.
The other thing that we'll see is individuals who just
are not eligible for legalization or normalization as a
consequence of this packet, no matter what this packet is.
There will be a substantial number of those people. And
those individuals I think will be subject to heightened
surveillance and increased enforcement in the wake of any
immigration reform package. In fact, Congress is very clear
about that border security is a prerogative, border security is
a trigger for legalization, and that means more enforcement
before you get any kind of legalization. So that means more
people in the pipeline potentially who have criminal
convictions and who are possibly removable for their
criminal convictions. So the takeaway from this is we can
expect to continue to see, even in the wake of immigration
reform, these issues to remain on the plate.
And I think the final point I want to make, there's
been brief mention of Chaidez made, and my co-panelists
will elaborate on the significance of Chaidez. One possible
way to read Chaidez, which says that Padilla is nonretroactive, obvious to say, is that anyone whose plea kind
of is pre-March 2010 is sort of outside the Padillauniverse,
you don't need to worry about arguments around
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effectiveness or mis-advice or lack of advice in the preMarch 2010 world. And I don't think that's right either.
And I think in particular things like mis-advice probably
may still be viable claims even for individuals whose pleas
were entered into prior to the March 2010 universe, and
there may also be other avenues for successful challenges to
the advocacy of counsel in those pre-March 2010 days,
depending on what stage the ineffectiveness of counsel
claims can actually be made. So we can talk a little bit more
about that. But the bottom line is, I think Chaidez, although
it closes the door on some pre-March 2010 claims, it doesn't
entirely shut the door on evaluating the efficacy of those
particular pleas, and so it's important to recognize that 2010
doesn't quite stand as the staunch beginning period
necessarily of everything that might relate to effective
information about immigration consequences in the criminal
plea process.
I think I've probably just about used my time,
exceeded my time. I'm not sure. So I'll now turn it over to
Ms. Vdzquez.
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: Just out of curiosity, how many
are students in the room? All right. And how many are in
the criminal defense attorneys, either defense or
prosecutors? Okay. Great. I actually am going to do my
talk more on where sort of I think the future of Padilla's
holding has led us and is leading us. One of the issues that
hasn't truly been discussed is the holding that Padilla had
was a split baby. And because of it, I think that it has
caused a lot of confusion, both with the courts, with defense
attorneys, and with prosecutors. I also am going to discuss
sort of the difference, and I know Mr. Long and Mr. Arnold
brought it up, the difference between sort of the Fifth
Amendment knowing and voluntary waiver of your rights
during the plea colloquy by the court versus the Sixth
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Amendment right to counsel and effective assistance of
counsel under Strickland.
One of the things that I thought was interesting this
morning was both Mr. Long and Mr. Arnold sort of
downplayed their role in Padilla. But I think as line
attorneys they -

and appellate courts attorneys -

that they

are probably really the front line of this issue. The Supreme
Court only handles about a hundred cases a year. The fact
that Padilla made it up to the Supreme Court was a fluke, a
miracle, whatever it was, but it's not the norm. The norm is
whether or not the line attorneys are there to be able to
represent their client in a way that gets them what their goal
is. Their duty is to provide assistance, that is the goal for
the client because these millions of cases aren't going to go
before the Supreme Court. And as Mr. Long said or Mr.
Arnold said, that Sixth Amendment cases were rarely going
up before the Supreme Court. This year marks the fiftieth
anniversary of Gideon, so there's been a lot of symposium
on whether or not Gideon is effective. Once we had Gideon,
it was decided there was a right to counsel. One of the
biggest complaints about Gideon was that it didn't establish
what that right meant. Was a warm body good enough? We
have Sixth Amendment case law where you can be drunk,
you can be on drugs. The attorney doesn't even have to be
there, he can go plug his meter while the trial is going, and
it's found to be perfectly okay. So again, I would hope that,
especially as students, that when you enter the world of
defense, as a defense attorney, that you aren't asleep, you
aren't on drugs, and you aren't clogged by alcohol while
you're representing your client because, while you may be
able to effectively represent your client under the Sixth
Amendment, that's not really what the goal is, I don't think,
of Gideon.
Again, Strickland created this two-pronged test, but
Strickland didn't occur until '84. So next year will be, what,
the thirtieth anniversary of Strickland, so we can decide
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whether or not that was a good decision or not. And then
we really didn't hear from the Supreme Court again until
about 2000. As you know, Strickland had established a twopronged test; the first was, Was the attorney's performance
deficient? And even if it was deficient, the client has to
decide whether or not he was prejudiced by that. Lockhart
established that, in the plea negotiation, it had to be
determined that, but for the ineffectiveness of counsel, they
would not have pled but would have insisted on going to
trial. Professional norms were used, but they only said it
was one, it was a guide. But it wasn't truly what the
ultimate or only goal was under Strickland. And so we saw
it wasn't until 2000 when the Supreme Court again stated
that professional norms were actually much more important
than the courts were giving credence to. These were death
penalty cases where the attorney failed to investigate or
mitigate for sentencing purposes, and so they said there was
a duty to investigate based on professional norms. And
again, when we see Padilla in 2010, they really stressed
professional norms. But hopefully, we're dealing with hopefully again - Jennifer talked about earlier, maybe in
the next twenty years, where we're going to go. But
hopefully, before the Supreme Court gets there, at least the
line attorneys and everyone else that really is doing this
groundbreaking work is already doing it.
One of the things with Gideon was they were saying
thirty-five states had already created a right to counsel, even
though the court hadn't gotten that far yet. So they were just
going ahead with what the states were already doing.
So anyway, and the other thing that they downplayed
is their sort of getting there by accident. I think, for many of
us, we get there by accident, so we should always be
prepared. My role in Padilla was with - Stephanos Bibas
was one of my colleagues. He was actually called by
Stephen Kinnaird. They had both gone to Yale together, and
they had clerked for Justice Kennedy. When Stephen got
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the case, he called up Stephanos and asked if he could do an
amicus. Because they believed that amicus briefs help the
Court decide whether or not to grant cert. And Stephanos
called me up because he knew my scholarship was in this
area. I was a public defender in Chicago in 1996. I was
assigned to a domestic violence courtroom. As Jennifer
said, in 1996 two of the harshest immigration bills - which
affected immigration - were created at that point. One of
the ramifications of those 1996 bills was deportation then
became possible for those convicted of domestic violence
offenses. And since I was one of the few Spanish-speaking
attorneys in Chicago, I was assigned to a primarily nonEnglish speaking courtroom where many of my clients were
non-citizens.
So again, I became an attorney in D.C. I just fell
into this, and I got the call from Stephanos as to whether or
not we were going to be able to go on to the amicus. We
were originally supposed to write this armicus for two of the
largest criminal defense organizations in the country. I
probably shouldn't be saying it while I'm being transcribed.
They actually said no. They said that they didn't want to
sign on to the amicus because there was no place in the
criminal justice system for immigration, and that, of course,
annoyed me to no end because as Jennifer said, since 1917
immigration has been into the criminal justice world. So
again, as you can see, in 2012, two hundred and twenty-five
thousand people were deported based on criminal
convictions. I unfortunately do believe that Padilla will
probably not decrease it, but it will actually help, I guess,
some individuals. But the three largest percentages of
people who are deported for crimes - based on drugs,
based on immigration violations, and based on traffic
offenses, whatever that definition is. That has to do with the
increased enforcement and drug crimes. As Jennifer said,
the war on drugs has been instrumental in sort of this
immigration-crimmigration connection.
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So all this was happening in the last thirty years.
You could tell in the Supreme Court cases they started to
take more of these immigration-crimmigration cases to be
able to distinguish whether or not some individuals would
be deported based on their crimes, especially in the terms of
aggravated felonies, which as you heard, either had to be
aggravated or felonies, especially with drug crimes. And
then because of this 1996 - 1996 also made this increase in
the amount of crimes that became deportable offenses, it
also made it retroactive. So for those individuals who had
pled guilty, for instance, in 1970 to something that was not
deportable at the time, the 1996 laws went back, so now,
actually, even though they pled guilty in 1970, they now
became eligible for deportation based on the change in laws.
So things started really running amuck, and the Supreme
Court started taking notice of this. And you could tell in one
of their cases, LN.S. v. St. Cyr, that they were not exactly
happy about it.
So when they took Padilla, we decided to write the
amicus anyway. We were able to write it by - it was
supported by immigration professors, criminal law
professors, and two or three immigration organizations. And
then cert was granted, and that got the ball rolling. And I
must admit that, it is true, I got phone calls saying that that
was not a good idea, we shouldn't do it. I was really happy
that it came out sort of good because, if not, I probably
wouldn't have a career right now. But anyway, so the
hearing was in October of 2009, the decision was in March
of 2010. And Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion,
and he sort of split the baby. While they said that there was
a duty to advise as to the immigration consequences of a
criminal conviction, what he actually said or the Court said
was, if it was clear the immigration consequences were
clear, succinct, or explicit, that defense attorney had to give
specific advice as to what those consequences would be.
However, if it was not succinct and straightforward, defense
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counsel only needed to advise that this could have
immigration consequences if they pled guilty. But anything
more than that, you would have to go to an immigration
attorney and find out.
One of the biggest things during oral argument in
front of the Supreme Court was an interesting - as Mr.
Long said, Dreeben, who was the solicitor general under
Kagan at the time, actually had a question by Justice Alito,
and he said, "So in a hypothetical, if I am a defendant, and I
ask you as counsel, 'What are the immigration consequences
if I plead guilty?' And he said, "Well, I don't really know,
you'll have to go get an immigration attorney for that." But
I say, well, I was appointed to you. I don't have money to
go get an immigration attorney. And counsel will then just
say, well, that's just too bad. Is that how you want our
system to be? And it was interesting because, after I left
oral arguments, I really thought that Justice Alito was going
to go with the fact that there was just an automatic right to
be able to receive specific advice. He and Justice Chief
Roberts actually decided that that was enough advice, just to
say there may be immigration consequences, but if you want
anything more than that, you need to go get an immigration
attorney, which again, you have to pay for. And since the
majority of people that are in the criminal justice system are
poor and too poor to afford a criminal attorney, let alone an
immigration attorney, it really causes problems.
But anyway. So we have this splitting sort of the
baby. How can you determine whether immigration is so
complex that all I need to, as the defense counsel, is to
advise as to it may have immigration consequences, or I
have to give specific advice? Now, in the majority opinion,
Justice Stevens states, well, in the case of Mr. Padilla's case,
all they had to do was open up the immigration book, the
I.N.A., and see that drug crimes is a deportable offense.
What he didn't talk about specifically was that actually Mr.
Padilla's conviction as an aggravated felony was his kiss of
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death. Lawful permanent residents who are convicted of
aggravated felonies are denied the right for cancellation of
removal, which is the discretion to be able to say, "Look,
judge, I've been here so long," "I have family," "Please tell
me I don't have to leave." They can't do that. So aggravated
felony for the drug trafficking is a little more complex,
although if you look at the federal guidelines or you look at
the federal definition, it became a little bit clearer, and after
the Supreme Court decided a couple of drug cases on that, it
became even clearer than that. But how far do you have to
go? Do I have to go look at a practice manual? And the
Court says that, or at least Justice Stevens implied, yes, you
do. But do I have to do anything more than that?
In the immigration book, it says "a crime of moral
turpitude." Congress has never defined what a crime of
moral turpitude is. So is that enough? Since I really don't
know, I can just tell my client? Well, I actually think that
one thing that Padilla did that was beneficial was that they
talked about plea negotiations. That plea negotiations is
actually a critical stage of representation and, therefore,
protected under the Sixth Amendment. Padilla in that
respect has been expanded. Last year, in 2012, two plea
negotiation cases came down, Lafler v. Cooper, Missouri v.
Frye, both on the same day, which that supported the issue
that, under the Sixth Amendment, you have to be able to
negotiate, and that is part of your Sixth Amendment duty.
So I do think that, although Padillasort of splits the baby in
terms of how much I have to counsel as defense, I do think
that Lafler and Missouri v. Frye actually answered that
question as to you need to figure it out. As a defense
attorney, you need to figure it out because you cannot
negotiate with the prosecutor if you don't know what the
heck you're negotiating for.
Missouri v. Frye was one where they didn't convey
the offer, and so that was a little bit easier because you can
argue, "Well, I can convey the offer to my client, but I don't
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necessarily have to know what that offer is." But Lafler v.
Cooper was where there was a plea offer, the defendant
wanted to take it. His counsel actually talked him out of it,
which was really a wrong decision, and at the plea it was
fifty-one to eighty-five months. He ended up rejecting the
plea, went to trial, lost, and was sentenced to a hundred and
eighty-five to three hundred and sixty months. And so what
the court said was that plea negotiations again is a critical
stage, that you have a duty - and mis-advice is ineffective
assistance of counsel. It goes back to Padilla. Padilla did
not - they decided that mis-advice versus non-advice is not
the issue because what happens if they were to split it. First,
it would create silence within defense counsel because they
wouldn't say anything because I would know, well, if I don't
say anything, I'm not ineffective. But if I try and I
misadvise, I am. And second, it would create defendants
who have the least ability to be able to represent themselves,
and that's what counsel is there for. So my argument,
especially after Lafler v. Cooper, is that you need to figure it
out. I do think there are ways. ABA has developed a threemillion-dollar project, which they're trying to get collateral
consequences across the country on one database. As you
heard, Mr. Arnold has already set up a chart. There's charts
across the country in each state that are developing.
Sometimes law school clinics are helping with that. It is
happening. The Bronx Defenders Association actually has a
collateral consequence unit. The I.L.R.C., which is out of
California, actually contracts with attorneys to be able to
give immigration advice. Private law firms and solo
practitioners are also contracting with public defender
organizations and solo practitioners, so it is something that
is here to stay. And as Mr. Arnold has said, it is our duty as
a criminal defense attorney to be able to help our clients
with their goals, and sometimes staying here is more
important than the criminal conviction itself.
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One of the issues that Mr. Long did discuss was this
increase. As we know, Padilla tried to keep it to
immigration, and they said that they would not address the
collateral versus direct consequences; however, across the
country you are seeing it. Sorry, Mr. Long. So it is
happening. Pension lost in Pennsylvania now has to be
advised to parole eligibility in Missouri and probably several
other states. Sexual offender registration in Michigan in
Eleventh Circuit and civil proceedings in Alaska are just a
couple of those that are expanding. Again, collateral
consequences are - there are many of them. But they
prevent our clients from being able to not only vote, to have
housing, to get themselves an education because they can't
get federal funding for it. It is very, very important to our
clients, and I don't think we can sort of play the victim and
just say, it's too complicated, because, if it's complicated for
us as attorneys, just imagine what it is like for our client.
Now, this Fifth Amendment versus Sixth
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment is the admonishment by
the court. Sixth Amendment is the right to counsel. Justice
Kennedy during oral arguments was really onto this. At the
point of Padilla, there were, I think, twenty-three states
which had plea admonishments done by the court.
However, there is a difference between a Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and a Fifth Amendment duty of the court.
Florida has litigated it. They first said that, yes,
admonishment by the court cured any defect by the
attorney. It was later overruled. I do believe that across the
country, again, when the court and prosecutors worry about
finality of the plea, that's the tension that we see. We see in,
I think it's Arizona, that the prosecutors are demanding that
any potential future Padilla is waived. So even if you don't
know you have a future Padillaclaim, you've waived it. So
it's interesting. We'll see how far that goes, if it ends up
going up to the Supreme Court. But again, our duty as
defense counsel is very different than the duty of the court.

Summer 2013 1Volume 9 1Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 93
And as we know, our clients usually don't say much once
they're in that plea colloquy, even if what they're hearing is
different or what they're hearing is something for the first
time.
So these are some of the things that I think are
coming as a result of Padilla. Again, I think in the lower
courts, it is a hit or miss, but I think still our duty as defense
counsel is to try to help to figure it out so that we don't have
to worry. It's a lot cheaper if our clients don't have to
appeal. It's a lot cheaper if our clients are deported. As you
heard Jennifer state, it's costing billions of dollars for
detention on - and deportation. And if we can just redirect
those funds and to increase spending in the crippled defense
world, it would be a wonderful thing, even though maybe
not a popular thing.
But I think I'll close my remarks right now, and I
look forward to discussing this further with you.
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: I also want to say thanks to the
Journalof Law and Policy and also to the Journalof Race,
Gender, and Social Justice for supporting today's
symposium. When I was invited to speak on this important
case, of course, I jumped at the chance. And to do so on a
panel with Yolanda and Jennifer is a real treat. Thank you.
I would like to talk about and offer some
encouragement for pushing beyond Padilla. Padilla
certainly is a step forward in some ways. The recognition
that the consequence of deportation cannot be described as
collateral in the experience of the person facing it is a
significant recognition. And I also would like to share
Jennifer's optimism that this reflects a little bit of realism on
the Court's behalf about what the world actually looks like
in terms of the connection between criminal proceedings
and immigration proceedings. So I think that Padilla is
certainly a step forward and a cause for some celebration.
But I also think that it has its shortcomings and that we need
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to be thinking about how to go further in some different
directions.
I will proceed in three parts. First, I will discuss
briefly what I mean when I talk about Padilla- what it is I
am claiming we need to go beyond. What are the
substantive and procedural shortcomings with Padilla that
I am talking about? Second, I will talk about, specifically
with reference to substantive shortcomings, how we can
push beyond the limited right that the Padilla decision
recognizes - how we can pursue the logic of Padilla to
further reasonable conclusions appropriate to the
criminigration world that we live in and that Jennifer
Chac6n described. And then third, I will spend a very short
amount of time on Padilla's procedural shortcomings and
what we might do to overcome those and turn Padilla into
some truly enforceable constitutional norms.
So what is Padilla, and what are the substantive and
procedural limitations that I am claiming exist? What is it
that I'm saying that we need to move beyond?
Substantively, although a step forward, I think that Padilla
represents a limited articulation of a constitutional right. I
think that what the Court is saying the Constitution
guarantees here is, in fact, somewhat an impoverished view
of what the Constitution can provide. I say that because
Padilla focuses solely on the ultimate consequence, on the
end game of immigration proceedings, on what the Court
refers to as deportation consequences. And I say what the
Court refers to because the fact that such proceedings are no
longer called deportation proceedings is a point worth
noting. They are called "removal" proceedings, which is
significant in thinking about the world we live in because
for me, at least, "deport" is a verb that clearly applies to a
person, whereas "remove" might be something that you do
with any sort of thing that you don't want in its current
place. I think the language of our current immigration
system says a lot about where we are with respect to
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immigration. I think it is significant that the Padilla court
references it as "deportation consequences." We see a little
more humane terminology in Padilla.
The Court discusses the severity of deportation as a
consequence and the automatic connection between some
criminal convictions and these severe deportation
consequences. These factors, the Court finds, make it very
difficult to cabin off deportation as a so-called collateral
consequence. So I think the constitutional right recognized
in Padilla is expressed very narrowly in terms of a
deportation consequence that is thought to be extremely
severe.
I also think that Padilla is not just substantively
limited in its vision but is also procedurally limited. A lot
of this is because of the posture that the case came to the
Court in and the precise question that the Court was called
on to decide. But the rule of decision that we are talking
about in Padilla is the Strickland rule. Tim Arnold earlier
lamented the deficiencies of Strickland, and he is certainly
not alone. Scholars have raked the Strickland text over the
coals for its inability to make good on Gideon's promise of a
lawyer, an effective lawyer for indigent defendants.
The Strickland test has two prongs. People this
morning have discussed this a little bit. The first prong is
the deficient performance prong. You have to prove that
your lawyer operated outside a wide range of what
competent counsel might provide. Stephen Bright referred
to this as the mirror test. If you can hold a mirror up in front
of counsel and it fogs up a little bit, we might have
satisfactory, constitutionally sufficient performance.
The second prong is the prejudice prong. You have
to prove that things might have been different but for your
counsel's deficiencies. And then the cases that Padilla is
mostly talking about are guilty plea cases. We are talking
about a situation where somebody comes before the court
and says, "Yes, I know I stood up and said that I did all
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these things, but actually, I would like to take that back and
go to trial. And I would like to get a jury in here, and I
would like to have several days for a trial." You can
imagine that courts might be somewhat loathe to let people
pass this second prong of the Strickland test. Those are the
two limitations that I see with Padilla. A substantive
limitation in terms of what the right articulated is and a
procedural limitation in terms of how you vindicate that
right.
So, how do we go beyond the limited substantive
right? How do we get beyond just the idea of the
deportation consequences? Jennifer Chac6n talked a little
bit about the crimmigration world, and one way of thinking
about that is that there are all sorts of crimes which carry
over consequences into the immigration world. But there is
another way in which crimmigration has occurred over the
last twenty years. It is not just that the immigration world
bleeds over into criminal proceedings in important ways that
Padilla says we have to be aware of, but it is also that the
immigration proceedings themselves have become
criminalized. As a clinical fellow at Yale, I walked into
immigration court for the first time to figure out how I was
going to teach students how to practice in the immigration
courts. And I had been a criminal defense attorney up to
that point, and I was a little nervous about going to
immigration court for the first time. But when I got there, I
was completely put at ease by the familiarity of what I
found. There were people in jumpsuits in detention that
looked a lot like the criminal courts that I was used to.
There were people appearing via closed circuit television.
There were people without counsel. I was not prepared for
the absolute lack of procedural protections that people in
immigration proceedings were accustomed to. Since I was
used to practicing in the criminal world, I was used to the
idea of a constitutional right to counsel and other forms of
due process. As my colleague at the time, Michael Wishnie,
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told me, "We have not had the due process revolution in
immigration court yet." So, immigration court does not look
that different from criminal court, and it shares, in fact, one
of the hallmark features of the criminal justice system,
particularly since 1996, which is pre-adjudication
detention. I would call it pretrial detention, except that you
do not get a trial in immigration court. You just get a
hearing.
Because immigration proceedings appear so
criminalized, many scholars have called for the importation
of criminal due process protections in immigration
proceedings. Once you start to realize how criminalized the
immigration proceedings look, it becomes easier to think
about the role of criminal defense counsel on the front end
of this. Think about two sets of proceedings: first, the
criminal proceeding in which a crime is charged and then, a
second proceeding, which is the immigration proceeding.
Although the Supreme Court tells us that the immigration
proceeding is civil, understanding it as highly criminalized
may help understand what the role of the criminal defense
lawyer on the front end might be. It seems quite logical that
a criminal defense lawyer representing somebody who
might be subject to a second criminal proceeding would take
steps, such as: (1) trying to avoid those additional charges
being placed at all, (2) improving the client's position with
respect to whether the client will be held in detention during
that second set of proceedings, and (3) improving the client's
position with respect to the ultimate outcome of those
proceedings. Once you realize that, you might say this
carries over pretty easily into the immigration world, and the
idea of what a criminal defense lawyer ought to be doing on
the front end goes beyond just the criminal issues.
Padilla,of course, recognizes only the third of those:
improving the client's position with respect to the ultimate
outcome. But I think that we ought to recognize all three,
and so here are some ways in which I think that we can push
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beyond Padilla to think about how the world ought to be,
and what the Constitution should guarantee, given the
realities that I have discussed.
First, we can expand the types of cases in which
criminal counsel actually must be appointed. For example,
misdemeanors that do not carry jail time, for which you
ordinarily would not get a lawyer under the Sixth
Amendment, can have immigration consequences. And a lot
of minor misdemeanor convictions result in people being
shuttled over to the immigration system to endure the
consequences of those convictions. There are a lot of cases
where there is no lawyer in criminal court followed by
serious consequences in immigration court. There are also
many misdemeanor prosecutions in criminal court where
you might not be afforded counsel because the prosecution
has indicated it will not seek jail time. For example, there
are many jurisdictions, such as Massachusetts, where the
prosecution can waive jail time, and therefore the court
does not need to appoint criminal counsel in those cases.
But lots of those cases can have immigration consequences
other than deportation. Specifically, one that is quite serious
is mandatory immigration detention. Again, as a criminal
defense person walking into immigration court, this struck
me as something new. I am used to going into court and
having my clients always have a chance for some sort of bail
to be set. In immigration proceedings, if you have been
convicted of certain offenses, there is mandatory no-bond
detention, which means you will be in jail throughout the
pendency of the immigration proceedings. Since the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases is ordinarily
guaranteed for those facing jail time, it seems like a logical
extension, particularly after Padilla, to apply the Sixth
Amendment right to misdemeanors that might not carry jail
time in the criminal case but do qualify for mandatory nobond detention in immigration proceedings. I think there are
other instances where we could think about expanding the
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Sixth Amendment right to criminal counsel - any case in
which an immigration detainer is filed, for example.
Alternatively, perhaps the appointment of counsel should
persist through the handling of issues related to an
immigration detainer.
So in addition to expanding the types of cases in
which criminal counsel must be appointed, Padilla also
suggests that we re-visit the idea of the types of services that
criminal counsel must provide with respect to immigration
consequences. And again, I am talking about a more
expansive view of immigration consequences, not just the
ultimate deportationconsequences.
Those
expanded
services
should
include
counseling. The client may need advice concerning not just
deportation consequences but also about immigration
detention issues. Is the client going to be subjected to
mandatory no-bond detention? Is the client going to be
subjected to a detainer? In appropriate cases, the client
probably needs some advice from counsel about whether to
discuss his or her place of birth or his or her citizenship
status with any other persons other than counsel, like law
enforcement or immigration officials who are visiting in the
jail. In appropriate cases, the lawyer should avoid making
any on-the-record references to immigration status. Courts
often sort of seek this information out during a plea
colloquy by asking, "Counsel, do I need to give a Padilla
advisement?" That might not be a question you want to
answer if your client is, in fact, going to be defending
immigration proceedings in the future. Here again, my
focus would be on improving outcomes for the criminal
client in this second set of proceedings, i.e. immigration
proceedings, not just with respect to the ultimate
consequence but with respect to every step along the way.
Additionally, in addition to counseling issues, we
could add some litigation to the criminal defense lawyer's
responsibilities, especially in regards to immigration
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detainers, which are incredibly important. An immigration
detainer is a piece of paper that federal immigration
authorities fax to a state jail or prison or a local jail saying
that they want the prisoner currently in criminal
proceedings for immigration proceedings. It tells the state or
local authorities that, when they are done with the current
criminal proceedings, they are to hold that person for a
period of forty-eight hours, not including weekends or
holidays, and then the federal authorities will come and get
the prisoner. In 2009, around 10,000 to 15,000 immigration
detainers were issued. Now it is a quarter of a million every
year. Immigration detainers are the way that the pipeline
has been set up to channel people from state and local
criminal proceedings directly into immigration proceedings.
And it happens that there are numerous legal issues
surrounding immigration detainers. Can your local officials
be obligated to hold someone pursuant to one of these
detainers? And if they cannot be required to hold
somebody, are they authorized to hold them? Does the
Fourth Amendment have to be satisfied? After Arizona v.
United States, we are told that state and local officials do not
have unlimited power to arrest people for suspected
immigration violations, but that is exactly what an
immigration detainer amounts to. It is a warrantless arrest
based on an alleged civil immigration violation. So there
are lots of legal questions surrounding detainers. The
criminal defense lawyer is authorized, and the Sixth
Amendment makes sure that this happens, to fight tooth and
nail to make sure that the client in a criminal case does not
get a two-day jail sentence at the end of the case. So why
would it be that a criminal defense lawyer would not be
similarly authorized to fight an immigration detainer? Or
why would the Constitution not require a criminal defense
lawyer to fight a two-day detention waiting at the end of the
criminal case just because it is pursuant to an immigration
detainer? So I think that there are questions about
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expanding the scope of defense counsel's obligation and
representation in those ways.
In regards to the procedural narrowness of Padilla,
of course we can continue to litigate these types of
claims the way Padilla did. We can bring a post hoc,
post-conviction petition and allege that counsel was
ineffective and that the ineffectiveness caused prejudice to
the client. But Strickland is a very hard test to meet. In fact,
it is probably the worst test that could have been put in place
to implement the rights that we are talking about. It really
has no relationship to Gideon's promise of having an
effective lawyer. So I would suggest that we need to think
about litigating Padilla on the front end as much as possible,
instead of coming to these issues from a post hoc position
where the courts are going to give strong consideration to
the finality that the court wants the pleas to have. We need
to litigate these issues up front. If public defenders are
overburdened by case load, they probably do not have the
time needed to meet the Padilla obligation. Overburdened
public defenders are not being given the resources or the time
to meet with their clients. For example, in New Orleans in
2009, the statistics indicated that the public defenders spent
about nine minutes with their clients per misdemeanor
case. If that is the situation, Padilla is probably best
litigated on the front end by motions to the court, which can
in many cases be made ex parte and under seal. Defense
counsel should ask for funding to consult with an
immigration attorney or to have an immigration attorney be
appointed to this case or for more time to consult with their
clients because this is an issue that they ordinarily do not
have time for. So, my emphasis on the procedural side is
we need to shift the litigation emphasis from the back end to
the front end.
Thank you.
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PAULA SCHAEFER: I want to thank all of you for being
here. It's been a great panel so far, and I think it might be
nice to start with asking you if anyone wants to follow up on
a comment that one of the co-panelists made. Was there
anything that someone else on the panel said that you want
to respond to? No? I'm going to ask one question then, and
then I'll open it to the audience and walk around with the
mic and ask some questions.
Obviously, Padilla is about effective assistance of
counsel. It's not about competence or best practices. I
would be interested in all of your thoughts about what
training law students and criminal defense lawyers should be
seeking if they want to achieve competence in this area.
JENNIFER CHACON: I guess I would start for the law
professors and for the law students who are kind of starting
their law career, if you are interested in criminal work, be
that prosecution or defense, take an immigration course.
You should have some fundamental awareness of the basic
collateral consequences that attach to criminal convictions.
And it's a pretty complicated, thorny area, and it's worth
having that overview.
I also would say - and I'll turn it over to you guys
to kind of offer more details. When I was preparing for this
panel and thinking about what I could talk about, I actually
had a research assistant go out, I said, give me a binder full
of kind of what the best practices are, what people are doing
to implement Padilla, what are the requirements but also
kind of how are people dealing with the requirements, how
are they setting up their own practices. And my research
assistant has done that. So I think, if it's possible, probably
through the conference organizers, I'm happy to provide sort
of my bibliography list of what these kind of resources are
so that, if you haven't accessed them or would like to access
them, you can find them. I found them - I could actually
kind of limit the list now, but I've read through most of them
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and identified the best practices based on what I've read.
And I'm happy to provide a list of those things. But that
might be some useful reading for people who are looking for
something that's concise and clear about what the
obligations are.
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: I think one of the things that's
been great is when I went to UC - I actually teach
crimmigration. So I teach a seminar on the intersection
between immigration and criminal law, and those classes are
popping up across the country, which I think is great
because I think, for many students who want to be either
criminal or defense attorneys or prosecutors, that's definitely
a class that they should take, especially if there's - part of it
is just practice, what's an aggravated felony, what's a crime
of moral turpitude. I think there's places across the country
that students - AILA, I think it's free for students, which is
American Immigration Lawyers Association - becoming
involved in that. I think setting up your own groups There are resources, Norton Tooby has great practice guides
that are really helpful. I think finding a public defender
organization or prosecutor's office that deals with this issue
and being able to intern, even working with an immigration
attorney during school or in the summer, I think is probably
really good. I do think it's something that, as Jennifer said,
all people who want to go into criminal law should be a part
of at this point. It is not going away.
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: And on top of that, I would
suggest going to immigration court and observing
proceedings for a lot of different reasons. The world that
you learn about in law school is very different from the
world that exists out there. And I think that is true across
the board no matter what substantive area of law we are
talking about. But as a criminal defense person, the practice
in the courts does not match up to what you would expect it
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will be after reading about it. And the same is true for
immigration court but ten-fold. I think that you can also
realize the impact that detention has on immigration
proceedings by going and watching immigration
proceedings. It is just like the criminal world, where pretrial
detention is used as a mechanism to coerce "consented-to"
outcomes. That is true in the immigration law as well.
Going to court makes you appreciate the actual
consequences that are at stake.
It is very easy for criminal defense attorneys to think
in an abstract way that their job is to bring the criminal
case to a successful conclusion and whatever happens in the
immigration court happens in the immigration court. But
going and seeing what actually happens there helps you to
understand that things are not going to get better over in
immigration court if you do not do your job on the front end.
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: As Jennifer said, and today others
have said, if you get a conviction in criminal court, once you
get transferred to immigration court, most of the time there's
no relief. It's that criminal conviction that really boxes a
client in, and so the only way you're going to save a client is
to make sure that he pleads to something that doesn't make
him deportable or at least you have some sort of relief. And
again, in immigration courts, since it's a civil proceeding,
you have a right to counsel but not at the government's
expense. And since the majority of the people in
immigration court are poor, just like in the criminal justice
system, their not going pro se in immigration court against
the government is pretty near impossible. And so we have
to also think of that as criminal defense attorneys. And
Chris talked about detention. Immigration detention
overshadows the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The Federal
Bureau of Prisons holds approximately 200,000 detainees.
Immigration is approximately 400,000, twice as many. So
again, this is something that's really, really important when
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we're talking about a conviction and whether then your
client is subject to mandatory detention. And again, as Chris
said, if they're mandatorily detained, they just want to get
out, regardless of whether they have relief or not.
JENNIFER CHACON: And the other thing I'll say is we
have been pretty focused on, as Padilla is very focused on,
the obligations of the criminal defense attorney in this
context, but I think, obviously, if prosecutors are concerned
about the finality of a plea, then they too need to be sort of
aware that these discussions need to be happening. And
they can be sensitive to whether they're happening and to
the extent that there are genuine justice concerns about often the prosecutor enters into negotiation and thinks that
they are actually helping somebody who seems relatively
sympathetic to getting a good deal. And it is not a good
deal, and I think that's the kind of - it's not a good deal if it
winds up in life-long banishment for somebody - the
seriousness of standard applies here. So I think although
this kind of - Padilla definitely frames the obligation in
that way, and although much of our discussions really
focused on that .obligation, there is kind of a broader
obligation that runs to judge and prosecutor as well, just in
the terms of the administration of justice.
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: And one thing, I guess I want to
As Jennifer said,
add because I forgot, citizenship.
citizenship is much more complicated than we think. But if
you can prove your client is a U.S. citizen, they're not
supposed to get deported. They have been deported, but
that's what's not supposed to happen. And so again,
citizenship isn't just where you were born, it's what status
your parents have and where your parents were born. I
think that one of the biggest things that I saw when I used to
do outreach was that there was a new law that said, if your
parent naturalized before you turned eighteen and you were
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a lawful permanent resident, you were in the legal custody
of the parent that naturalized, that you automatically became
a U.S. citizen. And most people do not know that. We
always found at least one or two children who were U.S.
citizens and did not know it. And there's a case, Juan
Estatz, out of New York. He was deported on an aggravated
felony, he was then found again, people like to return. In
New York City, he was sentenced to five years in jail. His
deportation was supposed to come. Immigration came and
said, "We were actually going to deport you, but we realized
that you were a U.S. citizen and you were actually a U.S.
citizen before we deported you the first time." And so then
he had to litigate because he was subject to parole, and they
wanted to keep him on parole. But the judge was like, "He's
a U.S. citizen," "You got it wrong the first time, 'You can't
keep him on supervised parole." But again, it happens, so
not only where he was born, what the status of his parents
were and sometimes even his grandparents.
JENNIFER CHACON: The other thing I would add just in
terms of kind of things that are important but may not
superficially seem important, the criminal record generally.
It's not just this crime and what are the consequences of this
crime, but are there other crimes in the past that are going to
give specific consequences to this crime, particularly if they
were crimes involving moral turpitudes or multiple crimes,
multiple criminal sentences, which takes something into the
realm of a particularly serious crime. Those kinds of
questions I think become important. To the extent possible,
knowing the full criminal record, knowing the full
immigration history, and then knowing any possible facts
that pertain to citizenship.
PAULA SCHAEFER: I want to open it to the audience. I
have a microphone that will help them pick it up on the
recording.
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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I wanted to ask a question to
Chris, but anybody can answer it. What as a public
defender practicing in state court do I do to fight tooth and
nail to get rid of that detainer? Do I file a motion in state
court, do I call the federal public defender's office and ask
them to file my motion in federal court, as even a motion?
And do you have one that I could have?
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: Sadly, I do not have a motion
because that would be such a nice answer. But I am happy
to talk with you at great length about fighting detainers tooth
and nail. There have been three class action lawsuits
brought that I know of that litigated detainers. One in
Connecticut was settled pretty favorably with the
Connecticut Department of Corrections changing its entire
policy about what detainers it was going to honor. I think
that that lawsuit really shook the Connecticut officials. The
idea that they were legally allowed to hold people pursuant
to detainers in all circumstances has sort of been the routine
part of criminal law enforcement. Detainers are not a new
thing for jails and prisons. So, when jails and prisons
receive immigration detainers, their first response is that
they should just handle this like a criminal detainer, which is
all pretty routinized and straightforward. But there are real
questions about immigration detainers and the legality of it.
I can point you to some resources that will help identify the
legal arguments that can be made and to some of those class
action habeas petitions that have set forth the different
grounds for relief.
PAULA SCHAEFER: I think we have one in the middle.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes. Two things, first,
Professor Chac6n, you said something about providing a
reference to somewhere where we could go to get forms or
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what have you. I get my responsibilities as a lawyer, but in
terms of the nuts and bolts JENNIFER CHACON: Yes.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Anything you could provide,
a list of questions, what do you ask somebody who you
suspect might not be a U.S. citizen in order to fulfill these
obligations. If you could provide that, that would be great.
My second question is: If you are someone who practices
doing appointed criminal defense work, either on the state
or federal level, have you all had experience with problems
getting compensated for immigration issues? Because, here
in the Eastern District of Tennessee, on both the state and
the federal level, we lawyers are hearing a lot about we're
spending too much money for CJA lawyers and things like
that and are looking at ways to cut back. If we are billing and this is sort of a practical matter - if we're billing for
things relating to, say, immigration issues, something that is
not strictly or necessarily related to the criminal case that
we're appointed on, do you have any thoughts about that, or
have you seen problems in getting those things sort of
kicked back at lawyers?
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: I was always the public defender,
so I didn't have to worry - I was salaried. But I do know
that there are people across the country that have been able
to get money arguing the fact that if they don't, under
Padilla- and now I think you probably could even under
Lafler - if you don't, you're basically ineffective, and
therefore, an appeal is going to come up, which is going to
cost more money. And then judges have actually started to
give money realizing that they can't - they want the finality
of the plea. So if you can articulate an argument that "I can
make this final, you just have to pay me up front, judges," at
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least some judges have been saying, okay, this is what
you're going to get.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: But it's like Padilla in your
request for, you know YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: Definitely. Right. And I
probably would even start to push the envelope with Lafler
with the plea negotiations as well, yes.
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: I certainly appreciate the bind
that you could find yourself in if you are worried about
getting denied on the back end of a case and you do not
submit your billing usually until the case is concluded. So,
one alternative approach would be to seek funding for an
immigration attorney under the CJA.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is that available under the
CJA?
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: Well, I have definitely seen that
argument made that funding for an immigration attorney
should be within the set of services that an attorney can seek
funding for.
UNIDENTIFIED
Thank you.

SPEAKER:

That would be helpful.

PAULA SCHAEFER: I've got a question here, and then
we'll go over here.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We maintain a website with
another organization called Defendinglmmigrants.org, and
we have all the nuts and bolts materials that the previous
questioner asked about in terms of what your obligations are
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in the scope of Padilla. So I would strongly suggest that
people go to Defendinglmmigrants.org.
Another thing I was going to ask was a question - I
heard a couple of people sort of talk about this second prong
of the standard for ineffective assistance in a plea case as "I
would have gone to trial." I understood that there would be
a probability of a different outcome, which could include a different plea would have been negotiated, which in the
Padilla post-conviction world, sometimes can just mean
instead of getting a theft conviction for 365 days, I would
have gotten that conviction for 364 days. And given the
probable willingness of most judges to have sentenced the
person to 364, especially if it was suspended, that might be
and I think some people have found that that kind of
outcome is more easy to secure on post-conviction rulings.
I'm pretty sure that that characterization is more accurate,
especially in light of Lafler and Frye, that there really is a
duty to negotiate an effective plea bargain; is that right?
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: I would argue yes. And just so
Dan, saying the difference, 364 through 365, that's the
difference between an aggravated felony and not an
aggravated felony. So that one day makes all the difference
in the world.
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: I would add to that that the
second prong of Strickland speaks about a reasonable
probability of a different outcome. People tend to sort of
cut to the chase and talk about whether there would have
been a different outcome. But technically that is not the
standard you need to meet. Whether that gets you anywhere
in your particular forum may vary.
JENNIFER CHACON: I think some of the articulation gets
muddled because I think St. Cyr formulates it slightly
differently. I think you could ignore that and argue the way
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that you're arguing. I think that's how Strickland articulates
the test.
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: Although, there are still some
jurisdictions that say he would have gone to trial.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have a question about what
you guys think in terms of the way that the criminal and
immigration system is set up, as all of you have articulated
it, with folks having access to a lawyer in the criminal
system but then often not having access to an immigration
lawyer once they're in removal proceedings, in terms of how
that plays into the actual enforcement of Padilla. So folks
who were misadvised or not advised in the criminal system,
let's say that happens, which I anticipate will, unfortunately,
continue to happen, it happens every day, all day long after
Padilla was decided. But still, a lot of criminal defense
lawyers don't know and aren't able to provide the kinds of
immigration advisements that they should under Padilla.
But folks are then pleading badly without being advised and
then being shuttled to immigration court, they don't get a
lawyer, they get removed. What are the chances that they're
going to bring ineffective claims? That is a real concern for
me in terms of the court saying in Padilla, "Look at this
great system we're setting up, oh, we're supposed to do X, Y,
and Z." And every one being like, yea, yea, yea, Padilla.
But then realistically, our non-citizens who have already
been removed who were advised badly because they pled
badly in the criminal system, so they didn't get a Padilla
effective lawyer, are they really going to be able to bring
ineffective claims? What are your thoughts on that?
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: Yes, there are huge barriers to
that. That is another reason why I think litigating everything
on the front end has become so important because the back
end is so ineffective to address this problem. But think
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about a case where you do not get a lawyer in criminal court
because you are charged with a misdemeanor that does not
carry any jail time. Then you go to immigration court, also
without a lawyer. I think we need to attack both of those
pieces. I think Turner v. Rogers offers some hope for
reinvigorating arguments about a right to counsel, at least in
some cases in immigration court, and it is the idea that there
are uncounseled criminal convictions that may be deficient.
This leads to another argument about why you need counsel
in immigration proceedings. You need counsel to raise that
kind of issue for immigration judges to take into account.
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: And I completely agree. If you're
not getting enough to finance the back end, really even
worse. I do think, like Chris said, Turner v. Rogers, I think,
is a great case for there to be some policy litigation that you
do have a right to counsel in immigration because you're
against the government and the possibility of deportation,
the Supreme Court has already said, it is a harsh penalty. So
I think there has to be some kind of litigation. I know under
Obama's comprehensive or immigration reform, he talks
about the discretion of the judge being able to appoint
counsel for unaccompanied minors, the mentally ill, and
some detainees. And so we'll see if that stays. So the
administration recognizes this problem, and hopefully we'll
be able to get in at that end as well.
JENNIFER CHAC6N: But I think you're right. The
bottom line is, for significant numbers of people, there's the
practical effect. They will receive bad advice or mis-advice
on the criminal end, and they'll serve a sentence. They will
be put in deportation proceedings. There will be no one to
reexamine what's happened, and then they will be in
Thailand or El Salvador or Britain or wherever it may be.
And that's the end of the matter, which I think goes to kind
of the earlier point about as much as can be done on the
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front end should be done on the back end. Really, it's not a
cure-all remedy that's going to get at every situation of bad
advice or no advice.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: One of the panelists
talked about how advice applied to different areas of law
outside of immigration, as far as collateral effects - Do
you think that trend is likely to continue, and is the legal
community, the legal marketplace going to be able to fill
that void cost effectively?
And is it likely that it
wouldn't?
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: I love the cost effectively. We
spend billions of dollars on detention. If we could just re the money is there, it's just spent differently. There are, I
think, what the Professor said - there's, approximately,
what, seventy thousand collateral consequences across the
country changing daily. And so do I think it's a trend that's
growing? Yes, I think it is something that is being litigated
because, again, it's the goal of the client, and if the client
needs to stay in his housing, if he wants financial aid for
school, those are all -

I think the right to vote -

they are

all very important things. I think, again, there has to be a
policy about doing something by curtailing the collateral
consequences that are attached versus sort of saying, well,
we're just - it's going to tie up our hands because we
shouldn't have to do this because it's too complicated and
just too much. So I do think one of the things about Padilla
is it reinvigorated, I think, defense counsel to be able to
really think that they could start litigating these things, and
it's starting to break through across the country. And I do
think that people will continue to do that, which I think is
good.
JENNIFER CHACON: I think what's tricky about it is it's
so patchwork. Depending on the jurisdiction you're in,
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which collateral consequences you're required to advise
someone about is going to be different, and I think that is
revealed by your list. And the collateral consequences are
perpetually shifting or changing in every jurisdiction. So I
think there is an effort on the part of - there's a working
group in the ABA that I think that Jack Chin is spearheading
that and trying to kind of get a handle on whether can we
create a database of what the collateral consequences are.
Can we make something accessible to attorneys that are
going to be in the position of having to give this advice? So
there is some work being done on that, but it's not done.
And it's not easy.
I think that to me kind of what I take out of this is that
perhaps one of the biggest favors that you can do any client
is try to figure out what their priorities are, what are their
priorities as a general sense, and to think about this. And
you're not going to be able to do that with regard to all of
the collateral consequences, given how many there are and
how varied they are. But I do think that to the extent that
you can at least very briefly get a sense of is the deportation
consequence more important than the criminal conviction Is the losing of the gun more important than the length of
the thing? To the extent that knowing you have some
general sense of what the client's priority is, that might help
to navigate, but it's not the answer.
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: In a way I think your question
highlights a real drawback of Padilla,which is its focus on
the lawyer instead of on the client. A whole different way
of looking at this is not whether are lawyers allowed to give
bad advice, but what do we do when a person receives bad
advice? So, instead of bringing up the question in terms of
obligation of counsel, which makes courts very motivated to
curtail that, maybe bring up some collateral consequences
that lawyers would agree are so far outside the realm of
criminal services. The most important thing to the client
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might actually be that the client got bad information from a
lawyer or some other source.
JENNIFER CHACON: And avoiding removal, deportation
is not always the goal of the client either. So I think that
may be an automatic assumption that people make, and it's
not always the right assumption. And there may be some
clients that are happy to be deported sooner to avoid a
lengthy criminal sentence and/or lengthy immigration
detention, and it's worth assessing that out too. But it's
complicated.
PAULA SCHAEFER: There's a question in the back.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I don't know which one of
you did this, but you quoted or recited a case a second ago,
I.N.S. v. Saint something, and then you explained it. It
sounds like an interesting case. I didn't get the last part of

YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: Oh, I.N.S. v. St. Cyr?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes.
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ:
think.

S-t. C-y-r. And it was 2001, I

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

Thank you.

PAULA SCHAEFER: We have a question over here.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
I would just like to follow
up on the first question in the back, which was, if you are
appointed to a client who does have an immigration hold,
the answer was a class action lawsuit. I'm not a class action
lawyer, I'm a criminal defense lawyer. Is there anything,
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any motion that can be filed to try to get that hold removed?
Just as an example, if someone has got a hold from another
state, well, that would fall under the Informed Extradition
Act, and in Tennessee there's actually a motion and a
procedure, a law to cite, to get that individual a bond. But
my judges say, "Well, that's a federal hold, I don't have
jurisdiction, and I don't know of anything even to file." So
if there were any ideas on that.
And the other is, recently ICE has been putting people
on probation. Maybe that is something that always existed
in the law, but it has only been utilized in my experience
here recently, meaning if they made their bond in state
court or if they were granted an OR bond after a period of
time where they were in custody only on the immigration
hold, they are being released on, for lack of a better
phrase, ICE probation, to see the disposition of that case.
Do you have any advice how to encourage ICE or to
petition for ICE probation?
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: I did not mean to suggest that
you need to file a class action lawsuit because I agree that
that would be really unhelpful advice. My point is that there
have been lawsuits filed, so you can get the pleadings in
those cases and maybe use those arguments as a starting
point for drafting up a motion or a pleading in a case that
you have. Whether state court judges are going to be the
best forum or not because of the problems you identified,
like this is federal law, is a question that will be answered
jurisdiction by jurisdiction. State courts have jurisdiction to
entertain a habeas petition, for example. You argue that the
criminal charges were dismissed, your client is being held
pursuant to this detainer, and there are the legal infirmities
with it so the client needs to be released. All state courts are
familiar with that kind of a habeas petition, somebody who
criminal
judges
is being held unconstitutionally. Some
might entertain a motion with respect to a detainer during
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the pendency of the criminal case. The criminal judge might
take the position that he/she has jurisdiction over the case,
and that includes telling the jail what to do with the detainer
or not. So, there are motions that you can think about filing,
whether they are going to be successful or not, of course, is
going to depend on your judges and their receptiveness to
the argument.
The other thing that people should be aware of is that, in
December of 2012, ICE completely revised its detainer form
and its detainer guidelines so that in theory they are meeting
a set of criteria before they issue these detainers. A good
starting point would be to get a hold of a physical copy of
the detainer that your client is being held pursuant to, and
check it to make sure what ICE says is true. For example,
maybe your client does not have three prior misdemeanor
convictions, which is what ICE is saying is true. That might
be an opportunity to negotiate with ICE directly about
removing the detainer or considering lifting the detainer.
PAULA SCHAEFER: Do you want to follow up?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
I want to point out it's very
easy for ICE to move whatever you file because all they
have to do is go get them, and so that really complicates the
efforts to try to do something about the detainer. File and
serve everybody, you've gone through all this effort, and
ICE just comes up and picks them up. So that's one of the
big challenges with the detainer issue. And on a case-bycase basis, and I think that's why the class action is so much
more helpful, although much more difficult, is because it is
so hard to do these case by case. It's on the front end
challenging them before they have been given a lot better
chance to get the case to actual adjudication.
Also I want to comment on this afternoon, Christina
Kleiser, who works in the public defender's office, that's
going to be on the last panel, and she's been pushing for the
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public defender's office to start - and you guys probably
know this because you work with her - to find immigration
persons and answer these kinds of questions for public
defenders. So this afternoon when she comes, it's a great
time to talk to her about how you can support that effort and
help her in doing that.
And then one last point I wanted to make, and this is
something that the first speaker spoke about at the very
beginning, but it's real important from an immigration
practice a lot of times you have a hard time convincing
people whose relatives have been detained that they can be
deported just because they're in the country illegally,
regardless of whatever their crime is. But I think on the
criminal defense side of this, it's easy to sometimes
disregard a good defense on the criminal issues because you
think, well, they're going to be deported anyway, they have
no status. And Padilla was a permanent resident. So it's a
different set of rules. In my experience here in Knoxville in
this jurisdiction, most of the cases we see are not permanent
residents, people with legal status falling into criminal
proceedings. Most of the time, the vast majority of time, it's
persons with undocumented status.
However, if
immigration reform happens, that is seriously going to turn
all that on its head because there's suddenly a vast number
of people who no longer previously had no options who
suddenly have some options. And to a small degree, that's
already happened because, over the past three or four years,
immigration has been directed by the Obama administration
to regain a little bit of the prosecutorial discretion that they
had foregone in the past, oh, ten or fifteen years. So even in
cases that someone is undocumented, there might still be
options if they're able to navigate successfully, navigate at a
criminal proceeding. So in a limited sense, even if they're
undocumented, it still matters, and especially if there's
immigration reform, it's really going to matter.
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JENNIFER CHACON: Yes, I would want to hammer that
home. I think, even if there's no immigration reform, you
might have someone who is eligible for asylum but might
not be eligible for asylum, say, if it's an aggravated felony.
You might have someone who is eligible for cancellation of
removal but might not be eligible for cancellation of
removal if it's the aggravated felony. So someone who is
unauthorized may well have serious status issues that are on
the line here. And then if comprehensive immigration
reform is enacted, things that people are pleading to now
may be the kind of decisive factor as to whether they're
eligible for that then. And so I think we need to be really
thoughtful about what it is that they're pleading to and what
the potential consequences are in the shadow of immigration
reform. And it's really difficult to know what that means for
particular people. And so you just have to kind of keep it in
mind as a broad source of information about what you're
doing.
PAULA SCHAEFER: I think we're out of time. I know
there's still some questions. I would invite people to come
up, and hopefully our panelists can talk for a couple of
minutes after we wrap up.
But I want to thank all of you. I appreciate you all
being here today. It's been a great panel.

